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Topos Uranos

Summary

The two previous units built, on the same language, two notions of what follows from some premises: deduction, Γ⊢φ\Gamma \vdash \varphi, which obtains strings from others with axioms and rules without asking what they mean, and semantic consequence, Γ⊨φ\Gamma \models \varphi, which runs through valuations without writing any deduction. This lesson proves that, for finite sets of premises, both notions coincide. Soundness (Γ⊢φ⇒Γ⊨φ\Gamma \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \Gamma \models \varphi) is proved by strong induction on the number of lines of the deduction, with one case for each axiom and for each rule, including that of the replacement of double negation; from it follow the consistency of the system and a method for proving that a formula is not derivable. The converse, completeness, requires a new instrument: Kalmár's lemma, which turns each row of the truth table of a formula into a deduction and whose induction on complexity has a single compound case, because joint denial is the only primitive connective; for that case two lemmas on joint denial are deduced in the system. By then eliminating one by one, with proof by cases, the hypotheses that fix the row, one obtains that every tautology is a theorem, and, with the two deduction theorems, that every consequence of a finite set of premises is deduced from it. From this follow the decidability of deduction from finite premises and the coincidence of provable equivalence with semantic equivalence. The case of infinitely many premises is left for the next lesson, because it requires the compactness theorem.

Learning objectives

  1. State soundness and completeness in their weak, finite and strong forms, distinguish them as independent properties and explain why the argument that obtains completeness “by soundness” is circular.
  2. Prove soundness by strong induction on the number of lines, including the case of the rule of replacement of double negation, and use it to prove the consistency of the system and the non-derivability of specific formulas.
  3. Deduce in the course system the two lemmas on joint denial and prove with them, by induction on complexity, Kalmár's lemma.
  4. Prove weak completeness by eliminating hypotheses with proof by cases, and completeness for finite sets of premises with the two deduction theorems.
  5. Apply the coincidence of deduction and consequence to decide derivability, provable equivalence and consistency, and to analyse what happens when rules are added to the system.

Two questions about the course system

The unit on deduction fixed the course system: Łukasiewicz's axiom schemas A1, A2 and A3 and two rules, modus ponens (MP) and the replacement of double negation (RDN), which the lesson on the four deduction techniques added after proving double negation. A deduction from a set Γ\Gamma is a finite sequence of formulas in which each one is an axiom, an element of Γ\Gamma, the result of modus ponens applied to two earlier formulas or the result of RDN applied to an earlier one; Γ⊢φ\Gamma \vdash \varphi means that there is a deduction from Γ\Gamma whose last formula is φ\varphi. The unit on semantics, for its part, defined in the lesson on semantic consequence and equivalence the relation Γ⊨φ\Gamma \models \varphi: every valuation that satisfies all the formulas of Γ\Gamma satisfies φ\varphi. Both relations are written with the same pattern, a set on the left and a formula on the right; their nature, however, is opposite. The first is syntactic and existential: it asserts that there exists a finite object, a deduction, which can be checked symbol by symbol. The second is semantic and universal: it asserts something about all valuations, which are infinitely many, and each of which gives a value to infinitely many variables.

Two questions therefore arise about the system. The first: does it deduce only what it should? The system is said to be sound if, for every set Γ\Gamma and every formula φ\varphi, Γ⊢φ\Gamma \vdash \varphi implies Γ⊨φ\Gamma \models \varphi: what is deduced from some premises is true under every valuation that makes the premises true. The second: does it deduce everything it should? The system is said to be complete if Γ⊨φ\Gamma \models \varphi implies Γ⊢φ\Gamma \vdash \varphi. Completeness admits three degrees, according to the sets of premises it covers:

  • weak completeness: if ⊨φ\models \varphi, then ⊢φ\vdash \varphi; every tautology is a theorem;
  • completeness for finite sets: if {γ1,…,γk}⊨φ\{\gamma_{1}, \ldots, \gamma_{k}\} \models \varphi, then {γ1,…,γk}⊢φ\{\gamma_{1}, \ldots, \gamma_{k}\} \vdash \varphi;
  • strong completeness: if Γ⊨φ\Gamma \models \varphi, then Γ⊢φ\Gamma \vdash \varphi, for an arbitrary set Γ\Gamma, infinite ones included.

This lesson proves soundness and the first two degrees of completeness. The third is proved in the lesson on the compactness theorem, and the reason for that division will be explained at the end of the lesson.

What should not be said

In Spanish, soundness is sometimes called “solvencia”, a calque of the English soundness; the Spanish term is “corrección”, and it is the one the course uses in Spanish. Nor should soundness be defined as the property of the system “of inferring an expression from a set of expressions”, which is derivability itself and not a property of the system. The errors of substance, however, are two others.

The first is to assert that soundness and completeness “can be inferred from each other”. They are independent properties: Łukasiewicz's system, without the rule RDN, is sound (the proof in this lesson proves it, with one case removed) and is not complete (the lesson on formal deductive systems exhibited a tautology that it does not deduce); and a system that adopted all formulas as axioms would be complete without being sound. Solved problem 2 examines both examples.

The second error is more serious, because it presents a circular argument as a proof of completeness. It says, in substance: if φ⊬ψ\varphi \nvdash \psi, then, by the deduction theorem, ⊬(φ→ψ)\nvdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi); “by soundness”, ⊭(φ→ψ)\not\models (\varphi \rightarrow \psi); and by the semantic deduction theorem, φ⊭ψ\varphi \not\models \psi. Now, soundness says that what is derivable is valid, and its contrapositive, that what is not valid is not derivable:

⊢χ  ⇒  ⊨χ,⊭χ  ⇒  ⊬χ\vdash \chi \;\Rightarrow\; \models \chi, \qquad \not\models \chi \;\Rightarrow\; \nvdash \chi

The step of the argument goes in the other direction, from ⊬χ\nvdash \chi to ⊭χ\not\models \chi, which is the contrapositive of ⊨χ⇒⊢χ\models \chi \Rightarrow \vdash \chi, that is, of weak completeness. If this is so, the argument assumes what it sets out to prove. It follows that completeness is not “inferred in a simple way”: it is the deepest result of the course, and its proof takes up most of this lesson. Finally, it is inaccurate to summarize completeness by saying that “all true expressions have a proof”; what has a proof is what is valid, true under every valuation, not what is true under some: the variable v1v_{1} is true under many valuations, and it is not a theorem.